Experience and Truthtelling by Valverde, Mariana
Summary
This is a Foucault-inspired, postmodern study of eth-
ical subjectivity. Technologies of life, personal truths
and relations between truth telling and intoxication
are highlighted in drug autobiographies and in mate-
rials from a study of Alcoholics Anonymous. Here
other notions of the self are at play than the concept
of the unified, autonomous, authentic self. These ma-
terials also offer an understanding of addiction as a
dysfunction or disorganisation of temporality in
everyday life. 
Inspired by some of Foucault’s work, thispaper takes a seemingly untheoretical setof low-status texts mostly written by
those on the front lines, and considers the
possibility that such texts may provide an
opportunity to contribute to debates in social
theory about ethical subjectivity. Also in line
with Foucault’s later work, ‘ethics’ here is
differentiated from the absolute moral codes
of both religious and secular deontological
traditions. Ethics is more about governing
oneself and one’s relations with others in a
situated, pragmatic and open-ended fashion
than about making general pronouncements
about universal values.
Terms such as ‘situated’ and ‘pragmatic’
are not, I hasten to add, synonyms for ‘rela-
tivism’. As Nietzsche pointed out a long time
ago, relativism – ethical or epistemological –
is simply the Other, the constitutive Other, of
the traditional codes of absolute Truth and
Goodness. Nietzsche observed that the ni-
hilists of his day, who saw nothing but chaos
and meaninglessness everywhere, were ob-
viously still in the grip of the old idea that
knowledge means absolute knowledge, and
that if we are to judge that a statement is a lie
we must somehow have access to the Truth.
These are mistaken beliefs, he said, rooted in
the old idea that truth needs to take an ab-
solute form. Nihilists are portrayed by
Nietzsche as still sitting in the church of
Absolute Truth even as they complain, like
an audience that thinks it’s been cheated, that
there is no Truth to be seen.1 Nietzsche was
not a nihilist, and neither was Foucault, be-
cause both of them sought to get us out of
3





1 The church analogy is not actually made by Nietzsche,
but I hope it is in his spirit. Cf aphorism #36 in The will to
power: “The philosophical nihilist is convinced that all
that happens is meaningless and in vain; and that there
ought not to be anything meaningless and in vain. But
whence this: there ought not to be? From where does not
get this ‘meaning’, this standard?” And in Aphorism #12:
“Nihilism as a psychological state will have to be reached
first, when we have sought a ‘meaning’ in all events that
is not there: so the seeker eventually becomes discour-
aged... Nihilism as a psychological state is reached, sec-
ondly, when one has posited a totality, a systematization,
indeed any organization in all events... but behold, there is
no such universal!” (1967, p. 23 and 12)
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church altogether, to help us to stop arguing
about whether one should cry or laugh about
the loss of universal meaning and try instead
to develop post-absolutist, post-universal op-
portunities for exploring both knowledge
and conduct.
If grand narratives have become hollow, if
grand Truth is nowhere to be found, there is
more to do than simply argue about whether
we should be happy about this or mournful.
By paying attention instead to the small
truths, the situated insights, that arise in par-
ticular situations, a different form for truth
seeking may begin to appear on the horizon.
Nietzsche has been dead for a century now:
for us today, the challenge is, in my view, to
go beyond the dichotomies of the late nine-
teenth century – Truth vs. relativism, God vs.
moral chaos – and begin to explore ways of
caring for one’s integrity while fostering sol-
idarity and responsibility that do not begin
by presupposing that any of us has a privi-
leged position above the fray from which we
can make either negative or positive univer-
sal judgements (including universal judge-
ments about procedure).
Foucault sought inspiration for his situat-
ed ethical reflections and experiments in
Greco-Roman practices of the self, including
writing practices such as the nightly exami-
nation of one’s day fostered by the Stoics. He
looked to the Romans and Greeks, I think,
because he wanted to explore ethical prac-
tices that were neither moralistic nor psycho-
logical. In the work of Seneca, Galen,
Plutarch, and a host of lesser known writers
Foucault discerned some possibilities rele-
vant to those of us who are no longer Chri-
stian, who are suspicious of neo-kantian le-
galistic normative codes a la Habermas, but
who are equally suspicious of modern psy-
chology’s quest for an inner ‘authentic’ truth
of the self.
The methodological decision to look at
previously neglected low-status texts is of
course not unique to Foucault. But, for the
most part, those who have argued that we
should learn from this or that ‘minor prac-
tice’2 have usually claimed that X or Y
should be counted either as “literature” or as
“philosophy” – as when feminist thinkers in
the 1970s and 1980s argued that a lot of 18th
and 19th century women’s writing had been
unjustly excluded from the canon because of
masculinist prejudices about what counts as
Serious Writing. Foucault invites us to par-
ticipate in the task of critiquing the canon in
a different, more radical manner. Rather than
claiming that a particular text or set of texts
(autobiographical tales of intoxication, ad-
diction, and recovery, in this case) should be
regarded as Literary or Philosophical, he ex-
poses the ways in which the work done on
the front lines by those inventing, evaluating
and trying out ‘minor practices’ has left a
rich archive documenting, and often critical-
ly analysing, the main techniques of gover-
nance characterising advanced capitalist so-
cieties. The writings of those involved in in-
venting and building municipal sewers; the
plans drawn by the pioneers of institutional
architecture in the 19th century; the self-
examination practices developed in texts by
minor Greco-Roman writers – these are
some of the low-status texts, ignored by con-
ventional intellectuals, that are explored and
analysed in Foucault’s numerous genealo-
gies of modern governance.
From De Quincey’s Confessions of an
Opium Eater in the 1820s, through the writ-
ings of William Burroughs and Timothy
Leary in the 1960s, to today’s mass-market
American recovery autobiographies, there is
a large and diverse archive of texts describ-
ing and analysing experiences with sub-
4
2 In ways that are consistent with Foucault’s later work,
Michel de Certeau (1984) has also explored how everyday
minor practices can be mined for philosophical develop-
ments.
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stances and with activities associated with
drugs, alcohol, and what is described as ‘ad-
diction’. It is my contention that examining
different strategies used by writers of what I
shall call “intoxicated lives”3 can shed some
new light on the philosophical question of
what has been called personal truth, as dis-
tinct from objective scientific truth. This
question of personal ethical truth is as old as
Socrates; but it is being asked and answered
in different ways in our own day – in low-
status cultural sites as much as in academic
theory. Academic philosophy is increasingly
irrelevant even to the educated elite: the pur-
suit of life’s “big questions” has been large-
ly relegated to the self-help shelf, the popu-
lar women’s magazine, the peer support
group, the TV talk show – and the paperback
autobiography.
Those of us with training in postmodern
thought have generally ignored the kind of
texts that I have been reading lately. And
when their ubiquitous presence on bestseller
lists has forced us to pay attention to them,
our reading of personal stories of intoxica-
tion, addiction, and recovery has been one
dimensional and snobbish. Highbrow culture
has always expressed contempt for popular,
lowbrow culture in a knee-jerk reflex man-
ner: But the snobbish dismissal of popular
genres by the academy that goes back to
Plato’s nasty comments about both poetry
and sophistry has acquired new force today
by being articulated with a specifically post-
modern theory that dismisses the texts con-
sidered here, a priori, as ‘confessional narra-
tives’.
For those of you not familiar with post-
modern theory, let me say a word about how
the flag of theoretical sophistication is waved
so as to dismiss all popular autobiography.
Postmodern theorists differ greatly in their
analytical tools and strategies of interpreta-
tion; but one thing they share is a great sus-
picion of two terms routinely taken for grant-
ed in most popular autobiography: ‘the self’
and ‘experience’. Borrowing from Fou-
cault’s genealogy of the invention of ‘man’
in the 18th century, from Derrida’s decon-
struction of the purposeful author, and more
generally from Nietzsche’s demolition of
‘the subject’ and his delusions of grandeur,
postmodern thought constructs itself as so-
phisticated precisely by ridiculing the belief
in the existence and importance of ‘the true
self’ that is the basic presupposition of much
autobiography. Theorists reason as follows:
If the self is just a grammatical effect, as
Nietzsche taught us, then isn’t it a delusion
to devote years to practices of self-discovery,
whether these involve ‘exotic’ travel, tran-
scendental meditation, romantic adventures,
or experimentation with drugs? And if ‘the
self’ is but a grammatical effect and/or a
western myth, then how can there be such a
thing as ‘authentic’ experience? Isn’t experi-
ence always culturally constructed, in the
same way and with the same codes that con-
struct ‘the self’ of that authentic experience?
Don’t truth-telling practices featuring the
‘real’ self in fact construct the very selves
that autobiography claims to reveal or dis-
close? From Foucault to Derrida to Lacan to
Slavoj Zizek, a vast body of academic theo-
retical work suggests that those who go to
twelve-step groups or listen to the advice
given in TV talk shows are hopelessly
caught up in the passé humanist myth of the
self-identical, coherent, free, autonomous
subject. Those who use words like ‘authen-
ticity’ and ‘self’ unselfconsciously are wal-
lowing in the deepest shadows of the hu-
manist cave. They could learn from us
philosophers if they tried hard, but there is
nothing we can learn from them.
5
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3 Addiction autobiography is a smaller subset within the
larger genre of intoxicated autobiography. Psychedelic lit-
erature, for example, is about intoxication but often es-
chews the categories and narratives of addiction, recovery,
and sobriety.
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As part of a book on alcoholism and its
management, I undertook a small ethno-
graphic work among Alcoholics Anonymous
(Valverde, 1998; Valverde and White-Mair,
1999). Through this for me novel research, I
was surprised to learn that, whatever the ex-
plicit theory, the practices of AA groups in
the Toronto area did not necessarily uphold
the standard modernist unified theory of ‘the
self’4. A brief example will suffice to give
some sense of my project. While attending
AA group meetings, I realised that the telling
of one’s whole story was only one of the
speech modes used at meetings, and in many
meetings this was limited to the initial speak-
er. Other participants did not generate a co-
herent narrative of excess and eventual re-
covery, or of sin followed by salvation, pre-
ferring to use their time to discuss, in a low-
key, often self-deprecating manner, how a
particular slogan or step might be useful to
them, pragmatically, to deal with a particular
situation. At many meetings, much more
time was spent discussing what the semanti-
cally vacuous injunctions “Easy does it” or
“One day at a time” might mean in a parti-
cular person’s practice than telling confes-
sional tales. Through discussions of tactics
for remaining sober or getting sober again
after ‘a slip’, AA members developed an ad
hoc, usually implicit, theory of the self as a
contingent aggregate or vector sum of di-
verse practices of self – a low-level theory
promoting not what Adorno called “the jar-
gon of authenticity”, but on the contrary, the
empiricist and pragmatist tradition that goes
from David Hume to Gilles Deleuze, the tra-
dition that sees ‘the self’ as a mere label for
“a bundle of perceptions”, habits, and forces
(see Deleuze, 1991).
To follow this up beyond Alcoholics
Anonymous, and beyond alcoholism, I de-
cided to explore the world of popular ethical
practices of self through published written
accounts, rather than through more ethnogra-
phy. I have only sampled the vast literature
on experiences of drugs and alcohol, so my
comments here are preliminary; but I have
read enough to be able to tell you that there
is more than one theory of ‘the self’ that
emerges from this literature. Some autobio-
graphical tales of drugs and alcohol do fit the
classic Foucaultian ‘confession’ – that is, the
set of techniques of self by which individu-
als are enjoined to ‘find’ and to describe their
true selves and to then engage in self-nor-
malisation, thus ‘making up’ the very self
that is supposedly revealed through confes-
sional narratives. But other first-person tales
do not fit the ‘confessional’ model at all, em-
ploying different theories and practices of
the self, often in an ad hoc, unsystematic
manner.
Truth telling and ethical
inventiveness
In looking for analytical tools to help me to
understand those dimensions of addiction
and intoxication autobiographies that go be-
yond or even challenge the confessional re-
lation and the utopia of personal authentici-
ty, the text I have found most illuminating is
a set of lectures given by Foucault at the end
of his life at Berkeley, under the general title
of “Parrhesia” – a Greek term that has a rich
set of political meanings, but which for my
purposes I will translate narrowly as ‘truth-
telling’, since I am interested only in the
ethical dimension of this concept.
Foucault, who as a Parisian intellectual
would never have dreamed of exploring the
ethical resources of pop culture and self-help
books, chose to undertake an exploration of
6
4 An influential book arguing that support groups in the
AA tradition presuppose and promote the unified ‘self’
critiqued by Foucault and other contemporary theorists is
Plummer (1995).
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Greek and Roman ethics to see whether, in
our own present, it is possible to think about
ethics without presupposing or constructing
a deep self. The literature he explored in-
cluded some bits of Aristotle and other major
philosophers; but the bits of interest were not
the Metaphysics but rather the (to philoso-
phers) incidental comments on such things
as dietary practices or tips on how to change
one’s sleeping habits.
With the rise of Christianity, a term arose
that came to retrospectively gather some of
the techniques of life (techne tou biou) de-
veloped in advice books, diaries, scrapbooks
of quotes collected from other authors, ethi-
cal reflections, and a host of other ‘minor’,
non-philosophical textual practices: this
term was “spiritual exercises”. Foucault’s
friend and colleague Pierre Hadot helped his
non-classically trained friend to consider the
significance and usefulness, for our particu-
lar present, not so much of specific Greco-
Roman philosophies but rather of certain
practices and techniques that were widely
shared across competing philosophies, and
which provided the pragmatic basis for their
development. Hadot’s own work (1995) sug-
gests that the most important thing that we
should learn from studying these ancient
sources is not this or that idea but rather the
more general lesson that philosophy was
then “a way of life”, a set of skills for living
reflectively, for leading the examined life.
In keeping with Hadot’s reconstruction of
the ethical, practical basis of Greco-Roman
philosophies, this is how Foucault (1983)
formulated his interest in these diverse, non-
systematic texts: “In all of these different
[spiritual] exercises, what is at stake is not
the disclosure of a secret which has to be ex-
cavated from out of the depths of the soul.
What is at stake is the relation of the self to
truth or to some rational principles.”
Here, ‘truth’ does not mean either scien-
tific truth or absolute moral truth: it is an al-
ways embodied and always relational, uni-
quely human truth – the truth invoked in the
old phrase “truth-telling”. The truth teller is
of course an old dramatic standard character:
the person, often a mysterious stranger, who
appears in order to make the audience see
how the other characters are deluding them-
selves. This truth teller isn’t necessarily
someone who has some Superman vision or
expert knowledge. Greek tragedies had their
oracles, and Shakespearean theatre has its
witches, and these of course had supernatur-
al knowledge. But the form of truth-telling I
find most relevant to the writing of intoxi-
cated lives is that which does not require an
oracle or expert, that which is purely rela-
tional. An ordinary person can function as a
truth teller without having prophetic quali-
ties, but rather through participating in a par-
ticular triangular relationship linking him or
her, the characters, and the audience.
Sometimes the truth teller addresses the
characters, enjoining them to look deeper
into themselves, usually unsuccessfully. At
other times, however, the truth teller is ig-
nored or dismissed by the characters, who go
on perpetuating their delusions while the au-
dience becomes wiser. The various forms of
truth telling are thus varieties of the dialogi-
cal relationship, if you like to use Bakhtinian
terms, or situated three-way interactive so-
cial relations, if you prefer sociological lan-
guage.
Drug autobiographies routinely deploy
the dramatic device of truth telling. Some-
times the drug user is presented as someone
who, when under the influence, becomes
free to tell truths (about the world or about
the self, or both) that he/she would normally
keep unvoiced or even unthought. At other
times, there is less emphasis on the subjec-
tivity of the user. It is the drug itself that is
said to more or less automatically ‘open the
doors of perception’ – as William Blake fa-
mously put it, in a phrase reiterated in the
7
OUTLINES • No. 1 • 2002
Outlines-2002-1.qxd  17-06-2002  13:28  Side 7
Mariana Valverde: Experience and Truthtelling
name of the rock band The Doors and in
Aldous Huxley’s 1954 book with that same
title.5 The ‘doors of perception’ genre uses
drug taking experiences as a hammer to beat
up on social conventions, conventions which
are regarded in Romantic fashion as decep-
tive, tradition-bound, superficial, and funda-
mentally untrue. Huxley, typically, warned
that “we must discover, and discover very
soon, new energy sources for overcoming
our society’s psychological inertia, better
solvents for liquefying the sludgy stickiness
of an anachronistic state of mind.”6
In contrast to the ‘doors of perception’
trope, in which certain substances act as
magic keys to a higher level of reality, much
of the first-person literature on drug use be-
ing written today invokes the opposite view,
namely that taking certain substances im-
pairs our vision and leads inevitably into lies
and self-deception.7 This is the ‘sobriety as
truth’ perspective promoted not only by Al-
coholics Anonymous but also by today’s
health-conscious middle-classes, who drink
far less hard liquor and beer than the previ-
ous generation, smoke a great deal less than
their parents and their working-class neigh-
bours, and whose quest for excitement and
mind-blowing experiences is more likely to
take the form of ‘extreme sports’ than drug
experimentation (Simon, 2001).
The psychedelic, doors-of-perception trope
and the sobriety/health model of the self
function as cultural opposites, as either/or al-
ternatives; but they share a fundamental as-
sumption. In both paradigms, drugs are pre-
sented as having a privileged role in the
process of truth telling. Given the crucial im-
portance of all types of truth seeking in our
society, it is thus perhaps not surprising that
tales of intoxication and addiction, which in
our culture are inextricably bound with ei-
ther gaining the truth (in the Romantic/psy-
chedelic model) or with losing it (in the so-
briety paradigm) have had and continue to
have a popularity that is not necessarily re-
lated to the popularity of the substances
themselves. Either positively or negatively, a
privileged connection is established in these
texts between drug taking and truth-telling.
“Truth-telling” is an open-ended activity
that is part of specific social interactions.
Unlike the scientific method, it is not a for-
mally defined means to a static end. It is a
process whose value is intrinsic. Unlike the
philosophy of science, ‘truth-telling’ asks
not how people have determined whether
statement X is true or not but raises rather
the following questions: “what are the moral,
the ethical, and the spiritual conditions
which entitle someone to present himself as,
and to be considered as, a truth-teller? About
what topics is it important to tell the truth?
What are the consequences of telling the
truth?”
In the lectures given at Berkeley in 1983,
from whose conclusion the above quotes are
taken, Foucault tells us that ‘parrhesia’ was
important to the Greeks because different
kinds of human relationships were governed
through truth telling. Of key importance to
Athenians was the political meaning of par-
rhesia as ‘free speech’. Free speech was seen
as the essence of democracy; but just as of-
ten, or perhaps even more often, it was asso-
ciated with demagogues seizing control of
the polis by verbally seducing the crowd,
and thus provoking crises in democratic in-
stitutions. But the term parrhesia also had
8
5 A good selection of ‘doors of perception’ accounts is
found in Jay (1999).
6 A Huxley, ‘Culture and the individual’, excerpted in
Jay (op. cit., 322-23).
7 The recent movie Traffic promotes this general view:
but interestingly, on the south side of the US-Mexico bor-
der the corrupting effects of drugs are presented sociologi-
cally – as political corruption – whereas on the northern
side the effects are confined to the individuals and neigh-
borhoods involved in drugs. In the US, the drug users lie,
but the political system is (largely) uncorrupted; in Mexico,
however, it is the system that is deceptive, not individuals.
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(and has) a less political, more ethical mean-
ing, and this is the one that concerns me
here. A question asked by the Greco-Roman
writers read by Foucault, and which many
drug autobiographies also ask, is the follow-
ing: how do we know that we are telling our-
selves the truth about ourselves? When we
look inward and engage in the practices of
self-examination that began with the Greeks,
were modified in a more judgmental direc-
tion by both Catholic and Protestant reli-
gious practices, and continue today in self-
help manuals and support groups, we seek a
certain truth that is not scientific. We seek a
personal, ethical truth that is true in respect
to our particular circumstances and biogra-
phy rather than absolutely true. But the prob-
lem that haunts all autobiography is that
even with the best intentions, with complete
sincerity, we cannot always be sure that we
are telling the truth. Freud of course gave us
a whole theory to explain the absence or the
difficulty of truth-telling; but Foucault, as
part of his long quest to open up a post-psy-
choanalytic and more generally a post-psy-
chological future, ignores this potential re-
source and concentrates instead on the less
‘deep’, more pragmatic and practical tech-
niques of self of Greco-Roman writers, par-
ticularly the Stoics.
Friendship and mentoring as
techniques for truth telling
One technique of truth-telling, or more pre-
cisely a technique for monitoring and as it
were ‘auditing’ the truth telling process, is
that advocated by Plutarch. Plutarch empha-
sises that self-love implies self-flattery (what
Alcoholics Anonymous calls ‘grandiosity’),
and thus leads us away from truth even when
we are fully sincere and authentic. “It is be-
cause of this self-love that everybody is him-
self his own foremost and greatest flatterer”
(Plutarch quoted by Foucault). The remedy
for self-flattery is to be found in a good
friend, a true friend who is constant, who is
not moved by his own self-flattery or his
own self-interest, and who can thus be trust-
ed not to give advice but to be what in
English is called “a sounding board” – some-
one to whom we can talk, who will mostly li-
sten quietly, and who will only stop us when
we go off into self-flattering untruths.
This theme of friendship as the key tech-
nology for the truth-telling necessary for an
ethical life is of course extremely well de-
veloped in both high culture (from Aristotle
to Montaigne) and in popular culture, from
the detective story to Hollywood ‘buddy’
films. But perhaps more relevant to the study
of twelve step groups and recovery general-
ly is the fact mentioned by Foucault in this
same text, namely that some Greco-Roman
writers advocate finding a person who is a
good sounding board precisely because he is
not a friend in real life.
In Plutarch, Seneca, and the tradition which de-
rives from Socrates, the parrhesiastes always
needs to be a friend. And this friend relation was
always at the root of the parrhesiastic game. As
far as I know, for the first time with Galen, the
parrhesiastes no longer needs to be a friend.
Indeed, it is much better, Galen tells us, that the
parrhesiastes be someone whom you do not
know in order for him to be completely neutral.
A good truth-teller who gives you honest counsel
about yourself does not hate you, but he does not
love you either. A good parrhesiastes is someone
with whom you have previously had no particu-
lar relationship. But of course you cannot choose
him at random. You must check some criteria...
This will remind those of you familiar with
AA of that key institution, ‘the sponsor’:
someone who acts as a sounding board and
who helps you to find your own truth with-
out preaching – and who is neither a profes-
sional therapist nor a good friend in the rest
of your life. A technique developed in the
9
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context of ‘recovery’ would thus appear to
invoke or re-enact some rather venerable
ethical practices, namely, the relation be-
tween oneself and one’s personal truth-teller
described in Greco-Roman ethical writings.
It would be possible to go on from here to
investigate other ethical practices that facili-
tate the work of narrating one’s intoxicated
life and one’s reflections upon this life, con-
sidering their possible or actual antecedents
in various ethical practices for everyday life
from the Greeks onward. But the example of
the ‘sounding board’ or sponsor will perhaps
suffice to indicate how such an investigation
might proceed.
‘The king of liars and the
frankest truth-sayer’:
the paradoxes of intoxicated
truth telling
Whatever the specific techniques used for
promoting truth telling – therapy sessions,
talking with friends, phoning a less personal-
ly invested sponsor – there are a number of re-
curring epistemological moves commonly
made in autobiographical accounts of drug
and alcohol use. Putting the question of speci-
fic techniques of truth telling aside, let us now
consider the various relations between truth
and intoxication constructed in this literature.
Two insights have emerged from what I
have read thus far. The first challenges the
vulgar-Foucaultian postmodern belief that
all popular autobiography reiterates the
modernist myth of the unified self. What I
have found is that narratives of intoxication
simultaneously uphold and undermine the
conventional modern narrative of the deep,
essential, psychological self.8 Admittedly,
the dominant theme of addiction memoirs –
though not of all intoxication writing – is
that we must find our own true self first, and
that only then we will become sober, regain
self control – and ‘therefore’, the story goes,
get rid of illusion. This is the standard North
American jargon of authenticity.9 A recent
example, unusual in invoking ‘sex addiction’
as a psychological fact, is Sue Silverman’s
memoir Love sick (2001).10 Its fundamental
assumption is that the cure for the condition
of sex addiction involves dealing with the
adult consequences of childhood traumas by
uncovering the ‘true’ inner self that has been
buried under the false self that the author
calls “addictgirl”. This is done in order to
‘freely’ take up the traditional wife role
rather than sleeping around with unknown,
risky men.11 In this book and countless simi-
lar others, we see the familiar North Ame-
rican narrative of the 1990s female self. The
deepest truth about the female self is sexual
abuse; hence, disclosing this truth is the nec-
essary precondition of curing eating disor-
ders, drug addiction, self-destructive behav-
iours, and all other forms of unhappiness and
untruth. Domesticity – in Love sick graphi-
cally depicted in the first impossible and la-
ter joyful task of preparing a good hot dinner
for one’s husband – then appears not only as
‘safe’ and sensible but also as truthful.
Despite the great cultural power of ‘so-
briety’ tales in which personal truth ends up
coinciding with social norm, many addiction
10
8 An erudite account of the philosophical antecedents
and context of the ‘deep’, authentic modern self is found
in Charles Taylor (1989).
9 Theodor Adorno (1973) invented the phrase ‘jargon of
authenticity’ to critique Jaspers and existentialist ethics
generally, but today the phrase is of obvious relevance to
twelve-step narratives of addiction and recovery.
10 See also the web site of “Sex and Love Addicts
Anonymous (SLAA)”
11 Not all self-diagnosed sex addicts prescribe traditional
marriage as their cure; there is some admixture of feminist
discourses on sexual autonomy in some of the discussions
of ‘sex addiction’ found in women’s magazines (e.g. a fea-
ture article in Jane, Nov. 2001) and on the SLAA web site.
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autobiographies, even those written by au-
thors who have consciously taken up the ‘ad-
dict identity’, effectively undermine the uni-
fied, purposeful, rational-choice but some-
how also spiritual self of recovery/sobriety
narratives. Those who are good writers – like
Sue Silverman – cannot help but describe the
‘unsafe’ excesses of the past so evocatively
as to create a distinct pleasure and frisson in
the reader. This is a paradoxical effect that I
previously documented in the AA ethnogra-
phy, in what women members saw as the
tendency of some men’s first-person “drunk-
alogues” to unwittingly romanticise drink-
ing. Aside from the effects of this familiar
problem of peer support groups – that is, the
unconscious glorification of the dangerous
but exciting times of the addicted past –
some autobiographical texts explicitly aban-
don the moralism of the recovery narrative
altogether, promoting instead the view that
there is no true self anyway, that the world is
indeed chaotic, that life is unjust and there
are no real truths. The portrayal of the
Scottish drug world in Trainspotting is a
well-known example of this antitruth dis-
course, and its popularity shows that the an-
archic meaningless lives described by
William Burroughs were not confined to the
sixties – although today normlessness is
more likely to be deplored and associated
with crime rather than celebrated and associ-
ated with art.
While in its more extreme form this genre
is uncommon today, traditional values and
norms are often deconstructed even in texts
that set out to document the road from perdi-
tion to safety and normalcy. Sometimes wri-
ters clearly intend to show the reader how
degraded they or their friends were when
they were in the grip of addiction, but, per-
haps because it is difficult to portray oneself
or close friends completely unsympathetical-
ly, the characters’ tendency to tell lies, steal
drugs, neglect their responsibilities, and so
on, do not always come across as unambi-
guously bad. 
At other times, the point is made that
habits of order and self-discipline are para-
doxically necessary for engaging in a life of
excess and abandon, since it takes a great
deal of forethought and organisation to get
and consume illegal drugs without being
caught12. Reflecting on the coexistence of
psychic abandon and rational planning in the
illicit drug user can lead to the larger philo-
sophical point that the same person can have
several selves, or a variety of ‘flows’ and
‘folds’, as Deleuze would say, without any
one of them emerging as the authentic one.
We see, therefore, that ‘the self’ that is so
eulogised and sought after in ‘recovery’ nar-
ratives is more precarious than it seems, par-
ticularly if we look at the actual effects of au-
tobiographical writing practices rather than
at whatever theory the author formally es-
pouses. Let us then continue the inquiry into
truth-telling in intoxication narratives, but
focussing now not so much on the self but
rather on the relation between the substance
in question and truth. Here, we again see a
paradox, a contradictory relation. The para-
dox that emerges from looking at different
accounts of the relation between drug use
and ‘truth telling’ is that consuming such
substances as alcohol or Ecstasy is both a
means to get at the real personal truth and a
way of hiding from oneself, continuing the
deception – as they often say, “living a lie”.
Sometimes these two poles are presented
as temporally separated. The addict, present-
ed as existing in the past, used to believe that
drug use leads to truth, but the person in re-
covery, in the last chapter of the book, has la-
11
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12 In her heroin memoir Ann Marlowe states: “what is a
[drug] habit but self-discipline? Most people don’t have
the capacity for it” (1999, p 159). Other writers do not
draw this conclusion, but their descriptions of the compli-
cated purposeful activity of seeking out drugs, especially
illegal ones, confirm Marlowe’s point.
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boriously learned that alcohol/drugs casts a
veil of deception and is based on continual
lying, and that sobriety is the necessary con-
dition of personal truth. This is the conven-
tion used by AA members to tell their stories,
of course, and it is common in cocaine and
heroin narratives. But some accounts percep-
tively note that the substance in question can
be seen simultaneously as a truth serum and
a Great Liar.
Some 19th century opiate literature devel-
oped this paradoxical view of what Cole-
ridge famously called “the milk of paradise”.
But my favourite account of the paradoxical
relationship of truth to drugs comes from a
text written in the US several decades before
the emergence of AA by the American work-
ing-class hero and journalist Jack London.
The title is John Barleycorn, which during
temperance times was a nickname for alco-
hol, whisky especially. This is how London,
himself a great practitioner of working-class
liquid male bonding, describes the dialectic
of truth and falsehood in drinking: “He
[Barleycorn] is the king of liars. He is the
frankest truth-sayer. He is the august com-
panion with whom one walks with the gods.
He is also in league with the Noseless One.
His way leads to truth naked, and to death.
He gives clear vision, and muddy dreams.
He is the enemy of life, and the teacher of
wisdom beyond life’s vision.” (1913, 4-5).
The first part of the dialectic is re-enacted
every time that we choose to take someone
out for a hard drink so they’ll spill the beans,
tell us the ‘real’ truth. And this truth-telling
dimension of drugs/alcohol has of course a
great literary support in the ‘doors of percep-
tion’ narrative mentioned above. This narra-
tive – which usually forms part of a larger
Romantic or neoromantic account of life and
truth – holds that everyday life is an im-
poverished version of reality; that normal
perception filters out a large part of the ex-
periential, emotional, psychological, and
epistemological spectrum, and that while it
is necessary to live in this half-aware, half-
asleep state to go to work and get on with
one’s life, it is imperative for those special
people who seek the whole truth to go be-
yond everyday routine to seek a higher, more
cosmic, truth – whether by smoking opium
or having a whisky with a friend or taking an
ecstasy pill at a party. A good example of this
genre is found in a quote from Terence
McKenna, a proponent of psychedelic truth:
For the shaman, the cosmos is a tale that becom-
es true as it is told and as it tells itself... This is
why the shaman is the remote ancestor of the
poet and artist... The ultimate wellsprings of this
creativity as hidden in the mystery of language...
Only by gaining access to the transcendent Other
can those patterns of time and space and our role
in them be glimpsed.13
This narrative assumes that truth exists ob-
jectively, out there, in the cosmos and/or in
the deepest recesses of the souls of the en-
lightened few. Psychoactive substances re-
veal it, by dissolving the layers of conven-
tion, inhibition, and custom. Humans seek
truth, in the universe, in their own soul, and
in a grain of sand – but they are not present-
ed as actively, historically, constructing
truth.14
A recent genre promoting this Romantic
view of a pre-given, static, beautiful truth
about humanity is Ecstasy narratives. Al-
though some accounts treat Ecstasy as just
another dreadful drug of addiction and brain
dysfunction, other accounts emphasise that
this drug stimulates perception and sensation
without causing hallucinations. You see the
world as it really is: you just feel better about
being in it. It is also said that the drug (by
12
13 McKenna quoted in David Lenson (1995). The chap-
ter in which this quote is found, ‘Acid metaphysics’, is a
good account of this genre.
14 See Charles Taylor (1989), chapter 21, ‘The expres-
sivist turn’.
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contrast to cocaine) does not lead to wild
sex, but rather to a cosmic feeling of oneness
with one’s fellow partiers. In some leftwing
accounts, this is loosely connected to anti-
globalization movements. Ecstasy is present-
ed as the opposite of the sovereign individual
of capitalism by praising the fact that when
under its influence you love everyone but
don’t want to own anyone sexually. Through
its supposed non-distorting enhancement of
both perception and sociability, Ecstasy fits
the role of the (ethical) truth teller better than
LSD or mescaline, which have been touted
as truth telling substances but without wide-
spread success.15
The consistent advocacy of psychedelic
truth is nevertheless rare these days. In North
America particularly, the War on Drugs pro-
paganda has few open opponents. The hege-
mony of the model of self that one could call
‘rational-choice sobriety’ is sometimes attrib-
uted to the machinations of the US govern-
ment. While the huge sums of money poured
into drug “education” by antidrug federal
programs are of course not without effect, if
we want to go beyond the conspiracy theories
popular among proponents of the ‘social con-
struction of social problems’ school, it may
be useful to concentrate not so much on the
more extreme claims about instant brain
damage and about ‘gateway drugs’ that can
so easily be ridiculed, and focus instead on
the ways in which the less extreme antidrug
claims of both scientific and educational au-
thorities converge or resonate with cultural
trends and ethical practices and ideals that are
widely shared by those who are progressive
and young as well as those who are older and
conservative. The fear of ‘losing the self’ and
losing access to personal truth is hardly a
neoconservative monopoly.
According to the very well publicised
views of the National Institute for Drug
Abuse, whose gigantic, extremely sophisti-
cated web site is replete with appealing col-
or pictures of brains under the influence of
various drugs, the consumption of illicit
drugs – tranquillisers and other legal psy-
chotropic drugs are rarely mentioned – di-
rectly causes deception, misperception,
changes in the structure of the brain, and
hence, a loss of ‘the real self’. The same
broadly Puritan theory of the relation be-
tween ‘luxury’ consumption and personal
truth is also found, however, in texts that are
much less fear-mongering, texts that pro-
mote a moderate sociological explanation. In
these texts – many of which are not produced
by government and hence have greater
claims to objectivity – alcohol and/ or drugs
are presented not as monocausally involved
in loss of self but as associated with the gen-
eral alienation of today’s modern society.
Alcohol and drug consumption are read as
symptoms of deeper cultural and social
problems. Ron Dunselman’s Dutch study of
drug and alcohol use, In place of the self,
conveys this soft version of the drug-as-liar
trope in its very title. Dunselman, like many
drug users who are uneasy about their drug
use, believes that in modern times, “the core
of our personality, the Self, is increasingly
deactivated, and that the drugs – rather than
the self – start to determine the interrelation-
ship and cohesion between thinking, feeling,
and the will.”(1995, 33)16
While this anxiety about modernity as
loss of self is widely echoed in drug autobio-
graphies, first-person accounts are less like-
ly than either official discourses or academic
studies to make generalizations about all
drugs and all drug users. In the accounts I’ve
read thus far, the claim that most clearly
13
OUTLINES • No. 1 • 2002
15 A number of books now exist documenting ‘raves’ in
Europe and North America, and these often contain per-
ceptive accounts of the popularity of Ecstasy. See also
Bruce Eisner (1994).
16 See also Gregory Bateson’s (1973) influential study of
‘The cybernetics of the self’.
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distinguishes first-person from ‘objectivist’
accounts is the distinction made between
‘good’ and ‘bad’ uses of psychotropic sub-
stances. Authors claim, often by reference to
the experiences of themselves and their
friends, that in moderate quantities, at the
right time, and/or for the right motives, con-
suming this or that drug can further truth
telling, but that this (often, the kind of use
practised by the author) is not at all the same
as the indiscriminate, purely hedonistic use
of drugs by less enlightened others. When
taken in excess, or for what the author deems
the wrong reasons, drug use becomes the
way to loss of truth as well as loss of self.
By allowing that some use of some drugs
can further truth telling, these writers dis-
tance themselves from the War on Drugs, but
they still perpetuate the view that pleasure
seeking leads away from truth. Authors are
thus able to hold on to both of the extremes
of the Barleycorn dialectic. We are told that
in moderation, at the right time, drugs – or
more often, just certain, healthier drugs – do
reveal the real self that is hidden by social
convention, by shyness, and by capitalist
work habits. On the other hand, if you be-
come a regular/excessive user, or if you
abandon marijuana for cocaine (or, in De
Quincey’s idiosyncratic account, if you start
to drink wine rather than eat opium), then the
true self will disappear. This popular drug
users’ game, through which ‘good’ sub-
stances are constructed as truth tellers by
contrast to nasty substances that have similar
chemical properties but that are said (usually
arbitrarily) to lead into falsehood rather than
truth was pioneered by the grandfather of in-
toxicated autobiography, Thomas de
Quincey:
Wine robs a man of his self-possession: opium
greatly invigorates it... Wine constantly leads a
man to the brink of absurdity and extravagance;
and, beyond a certain point, it is sure to volatili-
se and to disperse the intellectual energies;
whereas opium always seems to compose what
has been agitated, and to concentrate what had
been distracted.17
Problem substances thus pose a permanent
risk to the truth of the self, a risk which can
only be managed by certain enlightened,
self-governing users – those who will care-
fully distinguish good from bad drugs, good
from bad contexts, and/ or motives for taking
drugs, thus accomplishing the separation of
intellect-enhancing drug use from what is of-
ten dismissively called “hedonism”.
For example, David Lenson, who has
written a very thoughtful phenomenology of
drug use that tries hard to not be moralistic,
nevertheless makes a sharp distinction be-
tween ‘drugs of pleasure’ and ‘drugs of de-
sire’. The implication is that some drugs are
taken out of psychic compulsion, out of an
internalised capitalist relentless pressure to
consume more, rather than being carefully
selected for occasional civilised pleasure.
This way of ‘drawing the line’ is of course
ubiquitous in discourses about alcohol: wine
is constructed as a civilised drink of pleasure
by contrast to vodka or gin, which are as-
sumed to be drugs of compulsion, ‘inner
slavery’, and hence eventual loss of self.
This contrast was drawn in an influential
representation by Hogarth in the late 18th
century, in his famous two pictures featuring
a healthy ‘Beer Street’ of prosperity and do-
mesticity versus the vice-ridden ‘Gin Lane’.
By separating out different modes of con-
sumption in what are usually arbitrary ways
14
17 T De Quincey, ‘Confessions of an opium eater’, quo-
ted in M Jay (1999, 12). The Confessions, incidentally,
don’t live up to their name or reputation, since most of the
text is concerned with de Quincey’s search for literary 
fame, and is neither classically confessional nor primarily
about opium taking. But the title has made subsequent
generations of drug users imagine the text as an inspiration
for their own writings.
Outlines-2002-1.qxd  17-06-2002  13:28  Side 14
– often through the deployment of existing
prejudices about class and through triggering
current ideas about the ‘character’ of the
drugs themselves – a wide range of non-
American, non-abstentionist discourses are
able to maintain the Barleycorn dialectic
alive and well.18
The variety of relations between the self,
truth, and problematic consumption con-
structed in drug autobiography may help to
explain the popularity of this genre. We are
all fascinated by dramatic re-enactments of
the basic modern story about the loss (or
near loss) of self – a loss always associated
with the loss of truth – and the always pre-
carious and often heroic recovery of true
self. Dynastic tales of murder and incest
helped the Greeks to re-enact and overcome
the trauma that Walter Benjamin (1970)
called the “founding” violence at the heart of
the law of the police. Today, by contrast, we
are less likely to work on our selves by re-
course to tales of family, lineage, or nation.
We are more likely to look for tales about a
classless and stateless ‘deep’ self. These tales
are fascinating because of the longevity of
the minority view that ‘the milk of paradise’
can act as a truth serum, as opening doors of
perception that are usually closed. Perhaps
more radically, the genre also raises the
frightening possibility (a possibility that is
usually raised only to be quickly buried) that
the quest for true self is pointless because
there is no self, just a bundle of perceptions
and more or less random choices.
Addiction as a disease of
temporality
If on occasion drug autobiography challen-
ges the ‘True Self’ paradigm by negating it,
the genre sometimes goes beyond simple an-
archistic negation, providing instead an al-
ternative to the hallowed western narrative
of ‘the self, the will, and the truth’ that
people like Ron Dunselman take so much for
granted. One such alternative will be consi-
dered here by way of concluding this talk,
with the proviso that there are probably a va-
riety of other alternative constructions of self
and truth that have yet to be identified and
analysed.
As against the traditional view that addic-
tion is a disease not only of the self but of the
will more specifically, some narratives sug-
gest that what is experienced as ‘addiction’ is
not so much a fragmentation or dysfunction
of the self and the will but rather a less per-
sonal, non-psychological dysfunction or dis-
organisation of temporality. Addiction can
be felt, in other words, as a disease of time.
Although some accounts, for example David
Lenson’s, subsume the perceived problem in
temporality under an assumed psychological
condition suffered only by addicts,19 other
accounts suggest that the indeterminacies of
modern temporality are more cultural than
psychological. My favourite reflection on
‘addiction’ as a useful way of managing the
task of organising one’s time is the antipuri-
tan text of Richard Klein’s book on smoking,
Cigarettes are sublime (1993). Klein points
out that smoking may now be experienced as
an inner slavery or subservience to nicotine,
but it was experienced in the 1940s-1960s as
15
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18 I owe some of these insights to conversations about
representations of alcohol with Pat O’Malley and with
Daniel Robinson.
19 “Addiction can be defined as the chronic atomization
of consciousness by drugs or by some other time-splitting
obsession.” Addiction is “a condition that resists change...
Under such repetition, cognition is dulled and ethics
frayed...” (Lenson, 1995, p. 35 and p. 47).
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a way of punctuating the day and the evening
through a pleasurable and aesthetic activity
that, more than anything, served to mark and
specify time in an elegant manner. Hum-
phrey Bogart may look to us as if he was en-
acting on camera his addiction to the drug
that would kill him. But that is not how ei-
ther he or other smokers of the 1940s defined
their relationship to the concrete object ‘the
cigarette’, a non-functional, purely pleasur-
able object which they would never have
subsumed under pharmacocentric abstrac-
tions like ‘nicotine’ or ‘tobacco’.
An interesting source of ideas about how
drug use is a way of marking time non-in-
dustrially, and thus a useful technique for or-
ganising life in a post-industrial world with-
out recourse to the factory clock, is Ann
Marlowe’s heroin memoir. “Nonusers won-
der why junkies with serious habits don’t see
the absurdity of arranging their whole day
around their need for heroin, but they’ve got
it the wrong way around. One reason people
become junkies is to find some compelling
way of arranging their lives on an hour to
hour basis. Addiction responds to ruptures in
traditional chronology...” (1999, p. 57).
While she participates to some extent in
the American view that addicts have or are a
particular kind of self, she simultaneously
offers the view that it is cultural and histori-
cal factors that lead to the generalised feeling
of structurelessness felt particularly poig-
nantly by those who are young and have few
responsibilities. This feeling can be ad-
dressed and managed by the practices of
drug buying and consuming and by the
adoption of a certain cycle of highs and
lows. This is presented non-judgementally as
a way of marking time qualitatively as well
as quantitatively.
If we consider this experience of drug use
as facilitating the management of time in a
way that connotes pleasure and elegance
rather than alienated labour – and in particu-
lar if we detach it from the ‘addictive per-
sonality’ theory to which it’s often tethered –
we can see that there are ways of under-
standing drug and alcohol use that go beyond
the categories of truth and falsehood, au-
thenticity and deception. The person who is
adrift temporally may not need to go into
psychoanalysis to regain the lost self. That
person simply needs a satisfying way of or-
ganising time – something which is implicit-
ly acknowledged in the military insistence
on rigid schedules in residential treatment
programs. Is getting up early every day per-
haps more important for ‘treatment’ than the
chemical qualities of the methadone or the
therapeutic skills of the counsellors?
The dilemmas of temporality in industrial
and post-industrial lives are also crucial in
Alcoholics Anonymous and other twelve-
step programs. What is probably the most of-
ten verbalised slogan of AA, “One day at a
time”, does not involve making up a rigid,
military, disciplined self that is coherent
across different days: it is often used by AA
members in a pragmatist/empiricist manner
to do whatever it takes to remain sober that
day and that day only, which means one is a
different person from day to day. The alco-
holic of AA of course sees him- or herself as
an alcoholic all the time, forever. But it is in-
teresting that despite that theory of the self,
the practice of repeating and giving meaning
to very flexible slogans like ‘One day at a
time’ enables people to construct an ad hoc,
temporary, situated self that need not survive
into the future. While many treatment pro-
grams officially believe that in reorganising
time people are rebuilding their unified true
self, the actual practices sometimes indicate
that more flexible, less ‘deep’ and perma-
nent, and more situational selves are being
built and discarded and modified with amaz-
ing rapidity. And if restructuring temporality
does not have to involve shoring up the hu-
manist bourgeois self, truth telling may be
16
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more than the production of a confessional
narrative of the deep, essential self. It may
also work as a strategy with no fixed end-
point, a technique for promoting provisional,




The thoughtful two-volume study of Alco-
holics Anonymous undertaken by N.K. Den-
zin suggests that what Jack London descri-
bes as the experience of being driven to
drink past the point of pleasure, what he so-
metimes calls “the white logic” of John
Barleycorn, is “a disease of time.”(1987, vol.
2, p. 20). But Denzin incorporates and su-
bordinates this insight to the ‘recovery’ para-
digm, which he accepts uncritically. For him,
then, sobriety is all about restoring natural
cycles – the natural temporality of the true
self.
For those drinkers or drug users who have
stopped believing in anything like a natural
temporality or a natural healthy self, how-
ever, some of the experiences that go under
the name of ‘addiction’ may be usefully de-
scribed as related to dysfunctions or breaks
in temporality, but not in such a way as to
suggest that there is any natural temporality
to which one can somehow return. Instead,
writers like Ann Marlowe suggest that sobri-
ety is the hard work of actively constructing
a cycle, a temporality, a schedule, from
scratch – building a world for a not particu-
larly natural and not particularly coherent
self. 
There is a very rich variety of practices of
the self and ideas about the self, about con-
suming problem substances, and about tem-
porality and subjectivity, in the archive of
first-person accounts of drug and alcohol
use. Each of the ethical practices developed
by these writers – the practices of drinking
and drug consumption as much as the prac-
tices of sobriety – are ways of working upon
the self, partly by inward reflection and ex-
amination and partly through intersubjective
techniques such as talking with friends or
‘sponsors’. And all of these ethical practices
are also practices of truth. Lumping them all
together under the dismissive label ‘confes-
sional’ prevents us from understanding the
very different ways in which ‘the self’ and
‘truth telling’ work in popular accounts of
drug and alcohol use and addiction. It is time
for postmodern theory to take a more humble
attitude toward first-person narratives in
general and intoxicated autobiographies in
particular. If we are different from Plato in
part because we do not accept that some se-
lect few, the philosophers, have a privileged
access to the world of Ideas – if we are all in
the cave of shadows together – then it makes
sense to look around and learn from every-
one who is in the cave with us, seeing how
they, and we, are trying to cope with the fact
that nowadays most of us do know that truth
telling can only happen from a specific place
within the cave.
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